

HPE ARUBA NETWORKING FEDERAL SYMPOSIUM

Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM)

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Acronyms, POCs, and References

- Acronyms, Points of Contact and References are provided at the end of the slide deck
- Slide deck made available to audience upon request:
 - Please email ZeroTrust@cisa.dhs.gov with the subject title: HPE Aruba Networking Federal Symposium



Sean Connelly's Background

- 10 years at CISA (and former CS&C)
- 15 years supporting and/or leading TIC PMO
- Also have supported CDM & NCPS/EINSTEIN PMOs
- Co-author of NIST Special Pub 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture
- TMF Board Member (alternate)
- ~20 years in the federal domain



The Basics: Zero Trust

Definition: An evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move defenses from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources.

in other words...

Zero Trust is not about building higher walls – it's about designing better gates.

Traditional Network Security

- Focus: perimeter security.
- Multiple, siloed perimeter sensors.


Zero Trust Network Security

- Focus: holistic security.
- Layered, integrated security systems.



NIST SP 800- 207 Zero Trust Architecture

- The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-207 lays out seven tenets of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), such as:
 - Access is per-session and policy-determined,
 - Dynamic based Authentication & Authorization,
 - Extensive monitoring of assets, etc.
- Zero trust is a set of principles and not a single architecture or solution.
- ZTA is compatible with federal risk management guidance and cybersecurity initiatives including:
 - NIST Risk Management Framework,
 - Trusted Internet Connections (TIC),
 - National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), and
 - Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM).



Federal Zero Trust Efforts




As the Federal Government continues to expand past the traditional network perimeter, it is paramount that agencies implement data protection measures around zero trust.

There are several other zero trust guidance documents that have been produced across the Federal Government.




FCEB Zero Trust Landscape




The Principles

[NIST SP 800-207](#)
[Zero Trust Architecture](#)



The Imperative

[EO 14028](#)
[Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity](#)



The Strategy

[OMB M-22-09](#)
[Zero Trust Strategy](#)



[CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model](#)




[TIC Catalog](#)

The Operational Guidance



[Federal Cloud Security TRA](#)




[NSTAC Report](#)



Sean Connelly
October 3, 2023

TIC 3.0 M-19-26 & Core Guidance



1| Program Guidebook

2| Reference Architecture

3| Security Capabilities Catalog

4| TIC Use Case Handbook & Use Cases

5| Overlay Handbook

Traditional TIC Use Case

Branch Office Use Case

Remote User Use Case

Cloud Use Case




Zero Trust Maturity Model




CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model

- This Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM) is one of many paths to support agencies
- Version 2.0 was released in April 2023
- Intent: Help agencies as they develop plans to implement Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) in response to EO14028 Sec 3,b,ii (May 2021)
- OMB's M-22-09 (January 2022) requires agencies to achieve specific zero trust security goals that are organized using the ZTMM




Zero Trust Maturity Model Overview

- The ZTMM represents a gradient of implementation across five distinct pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities
 - Functional areas where zero trust principles must be implemented in order to create a secure ZTA
 - Cross-cutting capabilities must be satisfied for each pillar
- Heavily influenced by NIST, DOD, GSA, and NSA's zero trust publications
- This is a general model and is intended to provide direction for Agencies



What's New in ZTMM V2.0?

- Incorporated comments from ZTMM V1.0 Request for Comment (RFC) in 2021
 - [Response to Comments](#) published
- Revised Maturity Evolution
- Alignment to OMB M-22-09 (released January 2022)
- Expanded Content and Guidance across pillars
- Clarified Terms and Concepts




Additional Sources of Feedback

- A review of Zero Trust Implementation Plans with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Inputs from CyberStat Workshops
- Findings from National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Meetings
- Modernization Deep-Dives
- Individual one-on-one meetings with agencies, international partners, and the greater IT community.



Zero Trust Maturity Journey


- Each stage on the Zero Trust Maturity Journey requires greater levels of protection, detail, and complexity for adoption, with exponential growth in efforts and benefits.
 - **Traditional:** Manual configuration, response, and mitigation; static and siloed policies and solutions
 - **Initial*:** Starting automation; initial cross-pillar solutions; some responsive changes to least privilege; aggregated visibility for internal systems
 - **Advanced:** Automated controls where applicable; cross-pillar policy enforcement; least-privilege changes based on risk/posture; response to pre-defined mitigations
 - **Optimal:** Fully automated, just-in-time, self-reporting; dynamic least privilege access; cross-pillar interoperability with continuous monitoring, centralized visibility



*New with ZTMM V2


Pillar 1: Identity

- An identity refers to an attribute or set of attributes that uniquely describe an agency user or entity, including non-person entities.




Pillar 2: Devices

- A device refers to any asset (including its hardware, software, firmware, etc.) that can connect to a network, including servers, desktop and laptop machines, printers, mobile phones, IoT devices, networking equipment, and more.




Pillar 3: Networks

- A network refers to an open communications medium including typical channels such as agency internal networks, wireless networks, and the Internet as well as other potential channels such as cellular and application-level channels used to transport messages.




Pillar 4: Applications & Workloads

- Applications & Workloads include agency systems, computer programs, and services that execute on-premise, on mobile devices, and in cloud environments.




Pillar 5: Data

- Data includes all structured and unstructured files and fragments that reside or have resided in federal systems, devices, networks, applications, databases, infrastructure, and backups (including on-premises and virtual environments) as well as the associated metadata.




Cross-Cutting Capabilities

- These cross-cutting capabilities provide opportunities to integrate advancements across each of the five pillars. As agencies mature these capabilities with respect to a given pillar, they can also mature each capability independent of the pillars.
- These capabilities highlight activities to support interoperability of functions across pillars. As agencies mature these capabilities within each pillar, they can mature each capability independent of pillars as well.



ZTMM V2 New Functions




Cross-Cutting Capabilities are Matrixed

- The three capabilities are woven into each of the pillars.
- Each capability also has distinct maturity levels.

	Identity	Devices	Networks	Applications and Workloads	Data
Optimal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous validation and risk analysis • Enterprise-wide identity integration • Tailored, as-needed automated access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous physical and virtual asset analysis including automated supply chain risk management and integrated threat protections • Resource access depends on real-time device risk analytics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distributed micro-perimeters with just-in-time and just-enough access controls and proportionate resilience • Configurations evolve to meet application profile needs • Integrates best practices for cryptographic agility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applications available over public networks with continuously authorized access • Protections against sophisticated attacks in all workflows • Immutable workloads with security testing integrated throughout lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous data inventorying • Automated data categorization and labeling enterprise-wide • Optimized data availability • DLP exit blocking • Dynamic access controls • Encrypts data in use
	Visibility and Analytics		Automation and Orchestration		Governance
Advanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phishing-resistant MFA • Consolidation and secure integration of identity stores • Automated identity risk assessments • Need/session-based access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most physical and virtual assets are tracked • Enforced compliance implemented with integrated threat protections • Initial resource access depends on device posture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanded isolation and resilience mechanisms • Configurations adapt based on automated risk-aware application profile assessments • Encrypts applicable network traffic and manages issuance and rotation of keys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most mission critical applications available over public networks to authorized users • Protections integrated in all application workflows with context-based access controls • Coordinated teams for development, security, and operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automated data inventory with tracking • Consistent, tiered, targeted categorization and labeling • Redundant, highly available data stores • Static DLP • Automated context-based access • Encrypts data at rest
	Visibility and Analytics		Automation and Orchestration		Governance
Initial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MFA with passwords • Self-managed and hosted identity stores • Manual identity risk assessments • Access expires with automated review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All physical assets tracked • Limited device-based access control and compliance enforcement • Some protections delivered via automation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial isolation of critical workloads • Network capabilities manage availability demands for more applications • Dynamic configurations for some portions of the network • Encrypt more traffic and formalize key management policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some mission critical workflows have integrated protections and are accessible over public networks to authorized users • Formal code deployment mechanisms through CI/CD pipelines • Static and dynamic security testing prior to deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited automation to inventory data and control access • Begin to implement a strategy for data categorization • Some highly available data stores • Encrypts data in transit • Initial centralized key management policies
	Visibility and Analytics		Automation and Orchestration		Governance
Traditional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Passwords or MFA • On-premises identity stores • Limited identity risk assessments • Permanent access with periodic review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manually tracking device inventory • Limited compliance visibility • No device criteria for resource access • Manual deployment of threat protections to some devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large perimeter/macro-segmentation • Limited resilience and manually managed rulesets and configurations • Minimal traffic encryption with ad hoc key management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission critical applications accessible via private networks • Protections have minimal workflow integration • Ad hoc development, testing, and production environments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manually inventory and categorize data • On-prem data stores • Static access controls • Minimal encryption of data at rest and in transit with ad hoc key management



Mapping TIC Capabilities to ZTMM



•Stronger alignment:

- Visibility & Analytics Crosscut
- Network Pillar
- Application Workload Pillar

•Weaker alignment:

- Automation & Orchestration Crosscut
- Identity Pillar
- Device Pillar

Findings are unsurprising given history of TIC

117 Total TIC Security Capabilities




Other Zero Trust Efforts



TIC2 vs. TIC3 with SSE/SASE


TIC 2.0 - Traditional TIC/Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Service (MTIPS)

- Acceptable architecture to meet TIC 3.0 requirements
- Defined by the Traditional TIC Use Case
- Provides perimeter security by funneling all incoming and outgoing data through TIC Access Points




TIC 3.0 –Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)/ Security Service Edge (SSE)

- Acceptable architecture to meet TIC 3.0 requirements with greater flexibility than traditional TIC2/MTIPS model to account for multiple and diverse architectures rather than single perimeter approach
- Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) provided through policy enforcement parity with TIC Access Point



Related Efforts

To address gaps, CISA has produced strategic, technical, and operational documents.



- [Federal Zero Trust Strategy](#): Serves as the official zero trust strategy for the federal government with the goal of accelerating agencies towards a shared baseline
- [Zero Trust Maturity Model](#): Supports Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) in designing zero trust architecture (ZTA).
- [Cloud Security Technical Reference Architecture \(CSTRA\)](#): Illustrates recommended approaches to cloud migration and data protection for agency data collection and reporting.
- [Trusted Internet Connections \(TIC\) Document Set](#): Defines the concepts of the program (Trust Zones, PEPs, MGMT) to guide and constrain the diverse implementations of the security capabilities.
- [NCPS Cloud Interface Reference Architecture \(NCIRA\)](#): Accommodates collection of agency data from cloud environments.
- [Secure Cloud Business Applications \(SCuBA\)](#): Highlights development of methods for ingesting and processing multiple types of cloud-based threat information.
- [Extensible Visibility Reference Framework \(eVRF\)](#): Expands coverage for CISA CSD visibility requirements and provides measures for coverage of CSD visibility.



CISA Efforts towards Zero Trust – CLAW

CISA's Cloud Log Aggregation Warehouse (CLAW)

- As agencies move to modern, distributed architectures and from TIC 2.0 to TIC 3.0, participation in CLAW will be critical
- CLAW is a distributed log ingest service – AWS (2022), Microsoft Azure (now available), GCP next
- Initial telemetry of interest
 - Microsoft Azure Active Directory logs
 - M365 Unified Audit Logs
 - AWS Cloud Trail access and authentication logs
 - GCP & GWS logs
 - SASE type logs
 - Other logs – stay tuned



Why is moving to Zero Trust important?

- Some of the Zero Trust benefits that are important to CISA:
 - Reduce the Attack Surface
 - Improve the User Experience
 - Improve Incident Management
- Where we need help?
 - Education & training
 - Guidance (Use Cases and Playbooks)
 - Interoperability of solutions
 - How to measure Zero Trust progress



Acronyms

- Amazon Web Services (AWS)
- Asset Management Baselineing (AMB)
- Cloud Log Aggregation Warehouse (CLAW)
- Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)
- Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)
- Cybersecurity Division (CSD)
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- Cybersecurity Technical reference Architecture (CSTRA)
- Department of Defense (DoD)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Domain Name System (DNS)
- EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (E3A)
- Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)
- Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS)
- Executive Order (EO)
- Extensible Visibility Reference Framework (eVRF)
- Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB)
- General Services Administration (GSA)
- Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
- Identity Lifecycle Management (ILM)
- Internet of Things (IoT)
- National Cyber Protection System (NCPS)
- NCPS Cloud Interface Reference Architecture (NCIRA)
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
- National Security Agency (NSA)
- National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Office of the Technical Director (OTD)
- Persistent Access Capability (PAC)
- Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
- Program Management Office (PMO)
- Risk Management Framework (RMF)
- Secure Access Service Edge (SASE)
- Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA)
- Special Publication (SP)
- The Technology Modernization Fund (TMF)
- Trusted Internet Connections (TIC)
- Zero Trust (ZT)
- Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
- Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM)





Questions?

For CISA Media inquiries:

Contact CISA Media at

CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov

or 703-235-2010

Zero Trust Maturity Model Webpage:

<https://www.cisa.gov/zero-trust-maturity-model>

Zero Trust Mailbox:

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